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In October of 2003, an agreement was signed allowing for the creation of the largest market and 
reallocation of water in the United States. The Federal Quantification Settlement Agreement 
(QSA) sought to clarify usage of the Colorado River, which supports 40 million people across 7 
states and northern Mexico and serves as the water source for hundreds of thousands of acres of 
farmland in California alone1. Imperial Valley’s agricultural landscape reaches almost every 
American grocery store, as it produces the majority of domestically harvested vegetables during 
winter months and plays a vital supply role in producing feed for livestock in California and 
around the nation. This paper focuses on the response from the agricultural industry and 
farmworkers to the commodification and reallocation of water between the Imperial Irrigation 
District and the San Diego County Water Authority. In order to gauge the response, data on field 
crops, consumptive water usage and farmworker employment was collected from 2001-2011. 
This period was selected to measure changes because it represents pre-QSA (2001-2002), 
implementation (2003) and the scaling up of the QSA (2004-2011.) Finally, several interviews 
were conducted with farmworker advocacy groups and data on farm-related employment was 
collected in order to gauge the economic and social implications of the QSA. As a result, 
planning has a stake in the future of this particular region as it is the primary source for 
domestically harvested winter crops in the United States, calling for the need to bring water 
consumption by water agencies in-line with the reality of expanding urban populations in 
Nevada, Arizona and California. As water becomes an increasingly scarce resource, especially 
for arid regions, the QSA provides policy makers with an example of how the negotiation 
process works for an uncharted area for American planning, that is a market-based approach to 
the socially-optimum allocation of water.  
 
                                                
1 United States. U.S. Department of the Interior. Colorado River Water Delivery Agreement: Federal Quantification 
Settlement Agreement for Purposes of Section 5(B) of Interim Surplus Guidelines. By Gale A. Norton. Washington 
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The Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA) sought to correct water overuse by 
California’s Imperial Irrigation District (IID) by instituting conservation efforts and outright 
water transfers to a rapidly growing San Diego County. The QSA sets up the framework for the 
eventual transfer of up to 303,000 acre-feet of water by 2026 from the IID to both the San Diego 
County Water Authority (SDCWA) which is expected to gain 200,000 AF per year and the 
Coachella Valley Water District (CVWD) is to get the remaining 103,000 AF per year (Federal 
Quantification Settlement Agreement.) The physical water transfer occurs through the 
Metropolitan Water District’s (MWD) infrastructure vis-à-vis the Colorado River Aqueduct. The 
MWD is the wholesaler of water for most of urban coastal Southern California north of San 
Diego County. Most of the water inflow to the Salton Sea will cease by 2018 due to a loss in 
agricultural runoff water from Imperial Valley farms due to conservation efforts; this will 
accelerate the current shrinkage-rate of the body of water of 7 inches per year2.  
This paper focuses on the 200,000 acre-feet of water that will eventually be transferred 
from the IID to the SDCWA, currently; water is being transferred between these two agencies. 
The majority of the transfer will be accomplished by water conservation as opposed to outright 
decrease in water supplier for farmers (Federal Quantification Settlement Agreement 2003.)  
Farmer’s enrolled in the SDCWA funded fallowing program will receive payments to allow 
arable land to fallow, and implement changes the widely used flood-system of irrigation in 
preference of more efficient forms of field water delivery such as drip-irrigation systems3.  
Fallowing will only be allowed for the first 15 years of the agreement, or until 2018 (San Diego 
County Water Authority.) Additionally, the SDCWA will provide $80 million for conservation 
efforts such as on-farm water saving technologies and lining of irrigation canals (San Diego 
County Water Authority.) Most importantly, the QSA represents the creation of the largest water 
                                                
2 Simon, Matt (2012). The Salton Sea: Death and Politics in the Great American Water Wars, Wired Science Blog 
posted on September 14th, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/09/salton-sea-saga/5/  
 
3 San Diego County Water Authority. (2012, December 9). Water Authority Imperial Irrigation District Water 
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market in the United States by allowing for more than 200,000 AF of water to be sold as a 
commodity and reallocated. By a similar measure, it represents the largest RURAL to URBAN 
water transfer in American history. In the regional scheme of Western water-rights, the QSA is a 
part of a broader federally-led policy initiated by the Bureau of Reclamation to reduce the State 
of California’s use of Colorado River water to its basic annual apportionment of 4.4 million acre-
feet (San Diego County Water Authority.)  The Imperial Valley, under the control of the IID 
receives about 1/5th of total water rights allotted from the Colorado River. This paper will focus 
on how producers (farmers and farmworkers) have responded to changes in water use and supply 
policies enacted per the QSA.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Literature Review  
 
As the world’s population increases and water resources become increasingly scarce, 
there has been growing interest in improving the efficacy of water use. Allocation of water and 
subsequent pushes towards sustainable resource management, including water transfers, require 
the altering of institutional frameworks in order to accommodate changes to the way in which 
water is delivered, used and conserved.  
Howard Chong and David Sunding of the University of California in their piece titled       
“Water Markets and Trading” go into detail about water supply augmentation strategies and their 
effects. 
Water use is divided into agricultural and urban-use, recent scholars have further defined 
the two entities by how the water is actually utilized. Agricultural use is defined by its output or 
crops harvested from the use of the water. Urban use is split into industrial and municipal use, 
which is further defined into commercial and residential use. There is a difference between 
consumptive and non-consumptive use, the general standard is consumptive use being counted as 
water used to irrigate farms, however, only a portion of this water is drawn by crops, and much is 
lost by evaporation and seepage into the groundwater table. Without a clear definition of  “water 
used” it presents problems in the analysis of the allocation of this increasingly scarce resource, 
generally, this term refers to the application of water agriculture without adjustments to figures 
for return flows and urban use.  
Scarcity of water is the foundation for debate into what constitutes socially optimal 
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the most efficient use of water. Economist have long considered the socially optimum allocation 
of goods under the PARETO EFFICIENT or “…an allocation of resources when no person can 
be made better off without making another person worse off.” Generally, it results in marginal 
values of water (as a resource that is bought) across the multitudes of its use. Water is allocated 
to those who have the highest value for the commodity. At the 1992 International Conference on 
Water and the Environment, the scarcity of water and the need for its efficient allocation resulted 
in defining water as playing a key role in life, development and environment.  
THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTIC OF WATER 
 In a perfect market, free-market allocation of resources would be efficient and regulation 
unnecessary however, this framework does not apply to water because it is an unusual (unique) 
commodity. There are FIVE characteristics that differentiate water from other, more “standard 
commodities.” These characteristics differentiate water from other commodities because 
typically, commodities are defined by quantity; water is an atypical entity in that it cannot be so 
easily defined, but the following points add clarity: 
(1) Water is neither created nor destroyed; there is a fixed amount that is cycled through 
the hydrological process of the Earth. 
(2) Water policy deals with usable freshwater, excluding saltwater and water unfit for use 
by humans (contaminated by human or natural causes.  
(3) Usable freshwater takes form as precipitation, thus it is effected by climatic variation, 
a more recently, the effects of human-induced climate change and therefore its 
availability can vary drastically from year to year; this poses problems regarding the 
reliability of water as a commodity. 
(4) The use of water is dependent on its application; its quality affects the manner in 
which it can be used, potentially affecting the availability for purchasers.  
(5) Geographic and temporal considerations can affect the availability of water as a 
commodity for purchase because it cannot be compressed, not easily transported over 
large distances with ease nor can it be stored efficiently without large capital investment 
in related infrastructure.  
Failure to take into account the preceding qualities that water retains, as a unique commodity will 
allow for error in analysis. 
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 In order to properly frame water markets, it is necessary to discuss what constitutes a 
water transfer; according to the National Research Council, a water transfer is “any change in the 
point of or change in the type or location of use.” Water transfers take shape in a variety of 
forms, but can be generalized into either (1) transfer within an irrigation district, this is the 
simplest form, a more complex transfer is one that (2) is a water transfer across irrigation 
districts, but within a same river basin. The most cumbersome transfer is an (3) inter-basin water 
transfer, or moving water from one river basin to another.   
WATER MARKETS AND TRANSFERS 
 In economics, there is a well understood theory for which under perfect conditions, 
markets and the trading of a commodity would lead to both a socially optimal use and allocation 
of the product irrespective of initial allocation (Chong and Sunding 2006.) The authors go further 
in stating that water markets, operate in a similar fashion to stock markets, with one price for 
water and allocation would be according to each agent’s demand curve. The consequence of 
having a single price for the unique commodity (water) is that the price of water used in 
choosing crops as well as the implementation and use of conservation efforts. The authors prefer 
markets for water allocation as opposed to command and control (governmental decree) because 
markets are based on voluntary participation and decentralized coordination vies-a-vies a single 
price for water. The efficiency of markets poses several questions: What crops will be fallowed? 
Which counties will be sellers and buyers? What will be the external benefits and costs?  
EMPIRICAL MODELS OF WATER ALLOCATION 
 In water resource scare regions, agriculture is highly dependent on the diversion of water 
though a capital intensive system of irrigation infrastructure that includes canals, pumps, and 
storage units (reservoirs.)  Agricultural regions are now in competition for water resources due to 
increasing population centers nearby where water intensive industrial expansion and changing 
public perceptions around sustainability regarding natural resources.  These factors, along with 
the real limits of water delivery systems in the face of climate change push local and national 
governments towards limiting the supply of water and reallocating them from seemingly 
wasteful users (water-intensive monoculture) to the more efficient urban user and ecological 
restoration projects. 
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(1) Barriers to Trade: May be create from the resulting water rights regime, this may 
include the consideration of alternative implementation procedures for water supply cuts, 
which can change the allowable water trading and the regions affected by water supply 
cuts.  
(2) Heterogeneity: many agricultural regions practice monoculture 
(3) Multiplicity: The numerous responses to the altering of water supplies, usually a 
reduction that includes: changes to land allocation among crops, the adaptation of water 
conserving practices and the use of groundwater as well as the fallowing of lands. 
The authors consider three distinct models for analyzing water reallocation and the 
subsequent creation of markets and lead to the conclusion those incremental costs of 
reducing agricultural water supplies increases drastically, as the quantity of water reallocated 
increases. These models point to the idea that a cut in water supplies is not the most pertinent 
factor affecting social cost, but that the impacts are dependent on the extent of the water 
market and under circumstances for when trading is constrained, how supply cuts are 
distributed across regions. The following models are:  
(1) California Agricultural and Resource Model, or CARM was developed in order to 
predict the profit maximizing producers, namely, how farmers respond to changes in the 
supply and commodification of water in the short-term. CARM analyzes changes in 
production that follow changing market conditions which are classified as resource 
constraints. This model divides the state of California into 14 unique growing regions by 
selected traits such as agro-economic conditions, microclimate and resource costs. 
Cropping data is gathered from the respective county agricultural commissioner.  
 
(2) The Agro-Economic Model, or AEM allows investigates the impact of water 
productivity and the related impacts of water supply reductions on irrigation technology 
choices under alternative scenarios and enables the adjustment of predicted water use and 
technology choices to variations in weather and water technology 
 
(3) The Rational Mode or RM measures the immediate impacts from changes to policy 
regarding water supply and relies on micro-level data, using the water district as the 
measuring unit and crop data. Under RM, growers respond to reductions in surface water 
availability by ceasing production of the crops with the lowest marginal value of applied 
water. The RM is premised on the idea that growers have a great deal of flexibility when 
making long-term decisions surrounding both irrigation technology and cropping patterns 
but are limited in their response in the short-term. 
 
Measuring the economic impacts of water reallocation includes the impacts of supply cuts on 
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authors contend that there must be recognition of the uncertainty of the producer in relation to 
their behavior and the corresponding productivity of crops per water usage, or yield per unit. 
Constraints include the availability of data regarding as there is no one, comprehensive model 
that incorporates each   minute detail of problems that arise from water reallocation.  
 The modeling framework that Chong and Sunding use has a microeconomic model of 
resource allocation by irrigated agricultural sector; here, optimization is subject to water supply 
reductions and economic relationship. This relationship includes several assessment criteria such 
as the estimating the impacts of supply response on employment, and the regional gross product 
of localized agriculture. This model recognizes the plurality of producers, such as farmers, 
farmworkers and those who work in the chain produced by the multiplier effect of a base 
industry. Finally, this model takes into account the prior water allocation system that may restrict 
that restrict trading and the extent of water policy reform under reallocation constitutes the extent 
to which water trading is allowed.  
A report published by the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of 
Agriculture titled “Water Conservation in Irrigated Agriculture: Trends and Challenges in the 
Face of Emerging Demands,” examines contemporary issues around irrigated agriculture in the 
United States, with a focus on the Western United States published 2012.  
According to the report, domestic agriculture accounts for 80-90% of the national 
consumptive water use, and with expanding water demands from a growing population and 
recent Native American water-right claims in conjunction with watershed recharging issues 
stemming from climate change/variation the need for water conservation efforts in irrigated 
agriculture has grown immensely within the last two decades (Economic Research Service 
2012). Irrigated agriculture accounts withdrew 74 million-acre-feet from both surface and 
underground sources of water. These new challenges are particularly acute in 17 Western States 
that represent ¾ of all consumptive water use in agriculture; California is included (Economic 
Research Service 2012). Sustainable practices in agriculture and the general disconnect between 
technological innovations in irrigation devices and the fact that less than half of irrigated 
domestic cropland is irrigated with inefficient irrigation systems.  
 Projected climate change is expected to alter precipitation patterns and warm over 
temperatures, leading to reduced snow pack, which is a key source of water for water delivery 
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reduction of water supply to the dozens of water agencies in the arid West places a conservation 
imperative on water management practices and the viability of farming water-intensive crops and 
livestock.  
 In the West, Native American water-right claims have been estimated to be at 46 million-
acre-feet, as these claims are slowly recognized by the federal government, it will put added 
stress on water allocation infrastructure (Economic Research Service 2012).   
 The report found that irrigated farms account for 40% of the gross valuation of U.S. 
agricultural production, noting that the average value of production for an irrigated farm was 
three times higher than conventional dry land farms that are non-irrigated. Furthermore, irrigated 
farms supply 54% of the feed for livestock and poultry production, this signifies the importance 
of irrigated agriculture, particularly Western irrigated agriculture in the domestic food supply 
system (Economic Research Service 2012).    
 The report also noted that there was a 92% increase in investment in new and modernized 
irrigation systems between the years 2003 and 2008, reflecting the acknowledgment of the 
impending water crisis by public water agencies. Much of these efforts are privately financed.  
In an article published by the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of 
Missouri examines the “Framework for Estimating the Transaction Costs of Alternative 
Mechanisms for Water Exchange and Allocation.” Author Laura McCann presents a framework 
for including transaction costs as well as other transfer costs associated with water transfers. She 
delineates the process and makes three key point, they include  
(I) Current measurements of transaction costs associated with water markets has 
underestimated these costs by only by focusing on the costs incurred once a market 
exists  
(II) There is a need to include the costs associated with the development of a market 
mechanism  
(III) While the costs involved with the final transaction are easy to measure, those 
involved in the initial information gathering policy enactment and design and 
implementation of a formal market mechanism are rarely documented (McCann 
2004). 
 
Institutional changes are needed to improve water allocation systems, make them financially 
sound and provide incentives for adaptation of water saving technologies since many water 
allocation systems were developed during an era of resource surpluses (McCann 2004). 
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constraints to institutional changes to the water markets as any alterations to existing allocation 
systems are path dependent.  In addition, the costs of implementing new allocation systems 
depend on the broader legal system of the home country (McCann 2004). 
  McCann focuses her article on the transaction costs as they are the real resource costs and 
need to be quantified under an economic analysis that is reflective of the situation on the ground. 
Contending that the costs of establishing new allocation systems, such as a market for such 
transfers are often not included.  She draws from Salah and Dinar, Evaluating Water Institutions 
and Water Sector Performance, published in 2004. They contend that there may be considerable 
costs given political realities of the institutional environment; thus, assessing the efficiency gains 
from institutional change versus the cost of moving towards a new transfer system, these include 
the assignment of water rights and the transaction costs associated with market sales versus 
administrative allocation need to be a part of the analysis. 
 The framework that McCann develops for assessing the true costs (transaction) in an 
effort to facilitate the comparison of alternative surface water allocation mechanisms and 
enhance design. These mechanisms include: 
 
(1) Administrative allocation  
(2) Opportunity cost pricing  
(3) Informal tradable water rights  
(4) Formal tradable water rights  
 
Transaction costs are defined as the costs of running the economic system and the 
expenses of organizing and participating in a market or implementing a government policy needs 
to be included in auditing the full cost of water transfers (McCann 2004). Transaction costs and 
administrative costs are interchangeable concepts, thus water allocation can be affected through 
either administrative or market means (McCann 2004). She divides the process into Institutional 
Environment, Legal System, the Development of Market Enabling Institutions and the subsequent 




     Velasco 
  
 
 The delineation of the water-transfer process is important in understanding how to 
evaluate the effects of that moving water from one use to another. By examining the institutional 
environment and the legal system, we can understand the constraints and decision making 
process as we get a clear picture of the plurality of stakeholders. This leads us to review the 
development of the market enabling institutions, or the mechanisms onto which water is 
commoditized. Commodification is heavily regulated, and transactional costs associated reflect 
the negotiation between different stakeholders that happened previously. The ensuing market 
transactions result from the development of the process that allows commodification, which 
itself, is built upon the institutional environment and legal system.  
Importance to Planning 
 It may seem peculiar that an Urban Planning thesis such as this one is premised on a 
water transfer in sparsely populated, mostly rural area of California. The challenge for this paper 
is not so much the URBAN portion of the thesis, but rather, putting an emphasis on PLANNING. 
The QSA represents the one of only two cases (the other is the nearby Palo Verde Water District) 
of established water markets in the United States. In an era of increasing scarcity for water as a 
resource for both cities and agriculture, what has happened in the Imperial Valley has 
repercussions for the entire nation, particularly in arid regions where the completion for water 
resources between urban and rural uses become exacerbated due to climatic variation. The 
negotiation that took place between the seven water agencies and the federal government 
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negotiation process underwent years of meetings and legal actions and can provide policy 
makers both a likely timeline for the implementation of market solution to the problem of water 
allocation.  It remains to be seen if a market-oriented solution can provide for the socially 
optimum allocation of water; the QSA provides planners a case study to see if this approach 
produces benefits and if so, who is affected and why.  
Central Question 
The central question is: What has been the response to water reallocation 
and commodification as per the QSA in the Imperial Valley? There exist three 
subsidiary questions.  
(I) Agriculture: What has been the response to land allocation among crops from Imperial 
Valley farmers in relation to the reallocation of water per the QSA?    
     
(II) Water Use: What has the response to the reallocation and commodification of water per the 
QSA on the part of the Imperial Irrigation District’s consumptive water use and conservation 
efforts?  
 
(III) Farmworker: What has been the response to the water reallocation and commodification of 
water per the QSA on the part of farmworkers and farmworker advocacy groups? 
 
When referring to the QSA from this point forward, the reader should take into account that the 
QSA is a tool for the commodification and reallocation of water, therefore: 
 
Federal Quantification Settlement Agreement = COMMODIFICATION AND 
REALLOCATION OF COLORADO RIVER WATER UNTER THE CONTROL OF THE IID 
FROM IMPERIAL COUNTY TO SAN DIEGO COUNTY 
 
 
I. Agriculture  
 
 
Variable I: Imperial County Livestock Headcount 2001-2011. If the QSA has resulted in a 
change from the previous inefficient use and overabundance of available drinking water for 
livestock consumption, then we would expect to see farmers change the total headcount of 
livestock maintained as the amount of water available for water-intensive livestock consumption 
was decreased. 
(a)If less water is being used more efficiently, are we maintaining more livestock with 
less? 
(b)If the dynamics of livestock handling changed during the 10-year period, would this 
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Variable II: Imperial County Field Crops, 2001-2011. If the QSA has resulted in a true market 
correction based on the previous inefficient use and overabundance of available irrigation water 
then we would expect to see farmers decrease the harvested acreage of these water0intensive 
crops to offset losses in water availability. 
(a) If less water is being used more efficiently, than we would see a rise in less-water 
intensive crops. 
(b) If the dynamics on-farm irrigation changed during the 10-year period, would this give 
an explanation if there is more production in 2011 than in 2001? 
(c) Would market forces outside the scope of the QSA effect this subsector within 
Imperial Valley agriculture (after taking into account inflation) if gross value were higher 
in 2011 than in 2001? 
 
Variable III: Imperial County Yield per Acre, 2001-2011. If the QSA has resulted in a true 
market correction based on the previous inefficient use and overabundance of available irrigation 
water then we would expect to see farmers increase their yield per acre to offset losses in water 
availability. What has been the effect of the QSA on the yield per acre within the Imperial 
Valley? 
 
Variable IV: Total Acres Harvested for Imperial County. If cuts in total water usage were 
realized, we would see then that farmers would be discouraged from engaging in water intensive 
forms of agriculture. That being said, what has been the effect of the QSA on the total harvested 
within the Imperial Valley?         
 (a) What is the relation between acreage and water intensive forms of agriculture?  
(b) Does the market demand for such crops lead to water overuse by Imperial Valley farmers 
outside the mandates of the QSA? 
 
 
II. Water Use 
 
 
Variable I: How have conservation efforts and programs fared under the QSA? 
(a) How many AF of water have been conserved via on-farm conservation?  
 
Variable II: Will farmers increase their yields per acre, thus using more efficiently water? 
(a) How has this rural to urban water transfer affected the Imperial Valley’s agricultural 
output and employment?  
(b) Has the QSA resulted in a more efficient use of the declining reserves of the Colorado 
River?   
 
Variable III: How has the consumptive use of water by the IID been affected by the QSA?  
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Variable I: How has the QSA affected farm-related employment from 2001-2011? 
 
Variable II: What sort of programs has been put in place to lessen the economic effects of the 
QSA on farmworkers and firms? 
 
Variable III: What do social-justice minded organizations think the QSA has done for the social 
fabric of the Imperial Valley? 
 
Stakeholder Negotiations  
  
Policy reform surrounding water as a commodity and its subsequent reallocation faces a 
serious challenge when posed when it is trade. The regulatory framework it must undergo before 
it can be sold is especially problematic because it cannot be easily stored nor transported, without 
the infusion of huge sums of capital and the related infrastructure necessitates numerous public 
and environmental reviews. The situation becomes more convoluted because the supply of water 
is dependent on the earth’s natural, but varying hydrological cycle that is unpredictable affecting 
the overall supply which in turn, produces high levels of uncertainty amongst the purchasers of 
water.  
On October 10th, 2003, the Colorado River Water Delivery Agreement: Federal 
Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA) was signed by six parties; the agreement between 
the San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA), Coachella Valley Water District (CVWD), 
the Imperial Irrigation District, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD), 
the State of California and United State Department of Interior. Other effected entities include 
the Palo Verde Irrigation District and the San Diego County Mission Band of Indians was also 
given a stake in the QSA (Federal Quantification Settlement Agreement.) 
 Prior to the QSA, the Imperial Irrigation District had an “elastic” water right, or the 
ability to use 385,000 AF minus “Priorities 1 and 2” which were essentially water used by the 
Palo Verde Irrigation District and the Yuma Irrigation District. These two entities collectively 
used 420,000AF annually, leaving the IID to use approximately 3.43 MAF. Under the QSA, the 
IID had to effectively reduce its annual usage by 330,000 AF while transferring water to the 
SDCWA and the CVWA (Federal Quantification Settlement Agreement.)   
The QSA water transfer is made up of three components, those being: (1) Institutional 
Environment (2) Development of Market Enabling Institutions and the resulting (3) Market 
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involved in the crafting of the QSA: San Diego County Water Authority (SDCWA), Coachella 
Valley Water District (CVWD), the Imperial Irrigation District, the Metropolitan Water District 
of Southern California (MWD), the State of California and United State Department of Interior. 
Other effected entities include the Palo Verde Irrigation District and the San Diego County 
Mission Band of Indians and overseeing federal agency, the Bureau of Reclamation responsible 
for serving as the intermediary between the previously mentioned parties. In the context of the 
Imperial Valley, the Farmers Bureau, and the IID and to a lesser extent, farmworker advocacy 
groups all had a stake in the QSA. Over the decades preceding the QSA disagreements over 
water usage and allocation had led to several lawsuits between the institutions.  
The Market Enabling Institution(s) includes a water purchasing agreement where the 
SDCWA paid the IID for water transferred [through the use of the MWD’s infrastructure] 
(McCann, 2004, 1-6.) In turn, the IID would pay farmers under the fallowing program as a part 
of a larger conservation effort that included the lining of major portions of key water delivering 
canals and on-farm conservation. This conservation program enabled the sale of water between 
rural Imperial County and urban San Diego. Additionally, the SDCWA paid substantial sums of 
money in the creation of an economic mitigation program where those directly and indirectly 
negatively impacted by the QSA would receive payment for losses and training for non-
agricultural sectors.             
 The Quantification Settlement Agreement settled long-held dispute over water in this 
desert region by spelling out specific water allotment agreements overall reduction in reliance of 
water authorities in the State of California on the Colorado River. The QSA solidified the 
California’s annual apportionment to 4.4 million-acre feet. According to the SDCWA’s website, 
this was done through “voluntary” agriculture-to-urban water transfers and conservation efforts. 
However, this was not the view of the Imperial Irrigation District, which sought legal relief in the 
form of an injunction to prevent the QSA by obtaining an injunction in March of 2003 against 
the Coachella Water District and the U.S. Federal government. The IID’s injunction was 
invalidated on October 10th 2003, the exact day that the six-party QSA was signed (San Diego 
County Water Authority). Under the QSA, the nation’s largest irrigation district (IID) agreed to 
transfer 10,000 AF in 2003 by using a program of land fallowing, or letting agricultural land lay 
idle, thus, the water savings accrued by the program would be transferred to San Diego (Federal 
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scheduled to be implemented in 2008 and serve as the full source of water for transfer to the 
SDCWA. The “Fallowing Program” is voluntary for farmers who have recently used their fields. 
In the case of the Imperial Irrigation District (IID), a partial reason for the implementation the 
QSA was a means to regulate sales of water from their farmers to urban water agencies by taking 
the ability of that farmer to sell his or her water entities outside the jurisdiction of the IID. The 
plan was for the IID to fallow (let idle) about 40,000 acres of farmland it had purchased in an 
attempt to lessen the effect of constraints on its massive water supply (Andres 2013). The 
farmers petitioned to receive payment for fallowing of their land, the democratically elected IID, 
fearing a well-funded opposition campaign from the wealthy farmers succumbed to their 
demands. The IID set up a regulatory framework, which allowed farmers to receive payment for 
idling farmland per acre, but put in place a series of eligibility criteria, and sunset date, which 
























The Imperial Valley (synonymous with Imperial County) lies in the southeastern corner 
of California, bordered by San Diego County to the west, Riverside County and the Coachella 
Valley to the North, Yuma, Arizona to the east and Mexicali, Mexico to the south. Imperial 
County has some of the most extreme weather in North America, precipitation is sporadic, 
receiving anywhere from one to three inches of rain annual and temperatures rising as high at 
120f and as low as 25f. Generally, it experiences a hot, arid climate that supports some of the 
most productive agricultural regions in the nation due to a never ending growing season. Some 
80% of domestically produced winter vegetables come from over 500,000 acres of harvested 
fields4 (Clark 2011) 
For decades prior to the beginning of the 20th Century, businessmen dreamed, entered 
into collusion with Mexican diplomats and eventually were successful in their attempts to 
irrigate a region of the Colorado Desert known as El Valle de la Palma de Mano de Dios, or the 
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Palm of the Hand of God, an area of southeastern California and northwester Baja California, 
Mexico. The Los Angeles based-California Development Company bribed the Mexican Consul 
General in San Francisco to gain access (and thus bypass U.S. Federal regulators) to the 
Colorado River water for irrigation use in the Mexicali Valley in 19015. Soon, thousands of acres 
of farmland became productive on both sides of the border, however, a heavy snowmelt caused 
the collapse of the irrigation system, diverting the entirety of the Colorado River for 18 months 
in 1905 to the Salton basin which lied over 225 feet below sea-level in the north central portion 
of present day Imperial Valley (Alan 2005). It threatened to flood the entire Valley until the 
Southern Pacific Railroad closed the gap and rerouted the Colorado River. Unhappy with another 
corporately owned water supplier, residents of the white-ruling class petitioned for the creation 
of both Imperial County (separating from San Diego County) and public water provider-the 
Imperial Irrigation District (Alan 2005). For the following two decades, efforts were focused on 
upgrading and making efficient the local irrigation system tied to the development of massive 
damming projects during the 1920’s and 1930’s beginning with the Boulder Canyon Act such as 
Hoover Dam and the construction of the still-relevant All-American Canal, brining newly 
reserved water resources just north of the Mexican border to the over half-a-million acres of 
farmland on the Imperial Valley (Alan 2005).        
 Multi-racial class conflict arose in the Valley, sparked by the Great Depression and the 
organizing of workers by Los Angeles based groups’ banded together Mexican and Dust Bowl 
arrivals to the Imperial Valley. This unrest was put down by controversial tactics, such as 
kidnappings and violence         
 As the United States went to war in 1941; the Bracero Program brought thousands of 
migrant farmworkers from Mexico. Large-scale pest outbreaks lead to the first-time use of 
pesticide-based farming practices and the post-war trend of agricultural mechanization (Alan 
2005). Urbanization rates within the county rose as resident farmer owners began to move off the 
land and into the cities of the Valley (a trend that would lead to near 100% urbanization of 
Imperial County by the late 20th Century.) With the war over, the need for “emergency labor” via 
the Bracero Program was thought to have ended; in 1966 the program was formally ended. 
Between 1942 and 1972 Imperial County was often included in the top five grossing county for 
                                                
5 Rudy, Alan P. "Imperial Contradictions: Is the Valley a Watershed, Region, or Cyborg? “Journal of Rural 
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agricultural sales (Alan 2005). Mechanization brought with it the massive expansion of the 
average farm size in the Imperial Valley; for instance, in 1940 the USDA Agricultural Census 
reported the average farm size to be 143 acres, by 1974 it had risen more than 450% to 666 acres 
(Alan 2005). 
In the 1960’s, the present-day environmental issues gained the public’s attention as the 
Salton Sea began its ecological (and economic due to the abandonment of the recreation industry 
around the lake) collapse as increasing salinity levels and chemical discharges lead to large fish 
die offs (Alan 2005). In addition, the process of soil salinity became a problem for Valley 
farmers due to the hot, arid, sunny climate. This was due to Colorado River having naturally 
occurring high-levels of salinity; this caused farmers to flush their fields of salt by flooding them. 
Both the IID and farmers faced lawsuits contending that they used more water than allowed 
under the Colorado River Compact (Alan 2005).   
Concurrently, the United Farm Workers of America brought back the organizing of 
farmworkers, leading to a tumultuous strike in 1979 over wages and health hazard concerns 
stemming from the banning of DDT, a pesticide linked to a host of birth deformities and cancer. 
Going back to the Boulder Canyon Act of the 1920’s, there was a 160-acre irrigation limit 
imposed by the federal government in order to reign in monopolistic tendencies of the time, the 
farmer workers filed suit in court in order to enforce the acreage limit against the non-resident 
corporate interest that had come to control Valley farming (Alan 2005). The US Supreme Court 
sided with the corporate growers, solidifying their control over the economic engine of the 
Imperial Valley agriculture. The environment for the dominance of processor-shipping 
companies aligned in tightly controlled vertical-contracts that are in place to this day.  
Beginning in the 1980’s as a result of the Structural Adjustment Program initiated by the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the neighboring Mexicali Valley saw the 
creation of the Border Industrialization Program. This initiative established international 
investment zones where American and other foreign companies could set-up a manufacturing 
base (Alan 2005). By 1994, the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
created an industrial boom initiated just across the border from the Imperial Valley city of 
Calexico. This has led to the extreme levels of pollution in the New and Alamo Rivers as 
Mexican environmental laws were left unenforced as both raw sewage and industrial waste were 
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the Salton Sea.)  
NAFTA lessened the importance of agriculture in the Imperial Valley’s economy as new 
strip malls, border crossings and land distribution clusters were constructed to serve both the 
flow of people and goods from the city of Mexicali (Alan 2005). Industrialization and the 
opening up of the border allowed for the middle and upper classes of Mexicali to purchase 
lower-cost U.S. goods at national retail chains in the Imperial Valley and NAFTA initiated goods 
were distributed across the United States from distribution centers in Calexico (Alan 2005). The 
state had also constructed several prisons in the Valley. 
In the first few years of the 21st Century, the federal Bureau of Reclamation threatened to 
reduce Coastal California’s water allocation from the Colorado River unless the largest user of 
this water-the IID entered into agreements with other water agencies that included conservation 
and infrastructure upgrades to the then nearly 100-year old irrigation system that provided 
Imperial Valley farmers water to grow crops at scales and costs that were in not reflective of the 
true cost 6 This results from the IID setting below market rate for agricultural users of water that 
allows them to operate under the vertical contracts with processor-shipping company. This 
business environment created a need to keep overhead costs at a minimum because of the mega-
scale of farming necessitated the use of high-cost machinery to harvest. The IID is an elected 
public service provider (water/power); therefore, the IID was at the electoral mercy of the 
grower-farmers who relied on them undervaluing the cost of water needed to grow water-
intensive crops in a locality that receives 1-3 inches of rain (Andres 2013). 
The federal government was aware that the IID, which receives about 1/5th of the 
Colorado River water, had to curtail its overuse of the river in order for it to provide enough 
irrigation to the Central Arizona Project, designed to bring up to 1.5 MAF of water to the fast 
growing Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas7. Both Arizona and California have gone to 
federal court over the Colorado River water, used by seven states, stretching from the Mexican 
border to the state of Wyoming (Central Arizona Project) Now, add climate change to the 
discussion and we are now in a period of accelerated change and a new chapter in the history of 
Water Wars in the western United States where the federal government is tasked with being both 
                                                
6 Andres, Benny. "Imperial Valley and the QSA." Telephone interview. 10 Mar. 2013. 
7 "Central Arizona Project." Central Arizona Project : Water for Arizona's Municipal and Agriculture Needs. Ed. 
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the mediator and enforcer of water rights issues to one of the fastest growing regions of the 
country.            
 The QSA sought to clarify water rights and balance the needs of the economic engines of 
urbanity and the food producing rural regions both of which are valuable in maintaining food 
security in a time of increasing world population and economic certainty that there will be 
enough water for cities to flourish. However, the disequilibrium still exists between the actual 
use of the Colorado River, and the environmental realities of a river that in most years runs dry 
in the Mexican desert, failing to terminate at the Gulf of California.  
The most controversial aspect of the QSA was the transfer of more than 30 million acre-
feet from rural, agricultural use to that of urban in the form of water being transferred from the 
Imperial Irrigation District to the San Diego County Water Authority with the Metropolitan 
Water District’s water pumping infrastructure. The Imperial Irrigation District is charged with 
the delivery of water and power for Imperial County, California. It controls the single, largest 
amount of water in the western United States and under the QSA it is required to transfer up to 
100 billion gallons of it to SDCWA by measures of conservation and direct transfer (San Diego 




The years 2001-2011 were selected because this ten-year period is reflective of three time 
periods regarding measuring the affect the QSA had on the pattern of agriculture and the related 
effects on farmworkers within the Imperial Valley. Those periods are (1) Pre-QSA, 2001-2002 
(2) Initiation of QSA, 2003-2008 (3) Intensification of QSA, 2009-2011. Thus, by choosing these 
years, we would be able to gauge what changes, if any, the rural-to-urban water transfer 
agreement had on the Imperial Valley’s agricultural and farmworker functions because we would 
be able to see how the Valley functioned prior to the QSA, as the QSA was implemented and 
subsequently intensified.  
The Agricultural and Water Use sections are devoted to understanding changes to land 
allocation among crops, the adaptation of water conserving practices and the use fallowing as 
response to the QSA water transfer as a water reallocating mechanism resulting from the 
commodification of water controlled by the Imperial Irrigation District.  Measuring the economic 
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farmers are counted as producers of the regional gross product. The regional gross product 
includes the gross value of Imperial County agriculture as collected by the county’s agricultural 
commissioner.  
The modeling framework microeconomic model of resource allocation by irrigated 
agricultural sector in addition to portions of the CARM and RM are used to analyze changes to 
Imperial Valley agriculture, Water Use and the farmworkers from 2001-2011. Under CARM, 
gauging the response of changes to the supply of water will be done by noting any changes in 
production amongst farmers in the Imperial Valley that quantify the effects of the QSA in the 
short-term. The RM will measure the immediate impacts of changes to water supply policy 
(QSA) on the Imperial Valley’s by using the measuring unit of the local water agency (IID) and 
crop data to note any changes, if any, on the response to the reduction of water, if any, by 
choosing water-intensive field crops to measure the affect, if any, on the scale they are farmed 
because these crops meet RM’s definition of products that have a low marginal value (they 
require intensive irrigation for relatively low profit margins.) 
Estimating the impacts of supply response includes data on farm employment compiled 
from the California Employment Development Department, while Water Use data is collected 
from the IID’s QSA annual reports and the Bureau of Reclamation’s California Consumptive 
Use’s IID dataset. This thesis will study the impacts of the QSA as a response to changing water 
supply on farmworker employment, and the regional gross product of Imperial Valley farmers. 
Recognizing that farmworkers represent a large, but only a portion of the plurality of producers 
that also includes those who work in the chain produced by the multiplier effect of the Imperial 
Valley agricultural industry (see the section titled “The Importance of Agriculture on the 
Imperial Valley Economy.) Under the REALLOCATION OF WATER SECTION of the analysis 
we will take into account the prior water allocation system that existed in the Imperial Valley and 
whether or not it restricts water trading by farmers. The socially optimum use of water will be 
considered to be the best policy because it encourages efficacy of use, which results in the most 
net savings in the face of supply constraints that dominant the conservation around water in the 
West. 
As Per the recommendations from the work of Chong and Sunding, the majority of the 
agricultural and conservation sections will be analyze how Imperial Valley farmers responded to 
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land allocation among key crops and the attempt, if any on the modernization of their water 
application methods. The portion of the amount of groundwater pumping is excluded because the 
local supply is not utilized.  
The level of uncertainty among producers, if any, for both farmer and farmworkers will 
be studied, specifically, the relationship between their behavior and the corresponding 
productivity of crops per water usage, or yield per acre/bale will be used to gauge farmer 
behavior and interviews with farmworker advocates will provide a consensus of how the QSA, 
as a tool of commodification, reallocation and most importantly, economic mitigation efforts on 
the part of the controller of water (the IID) has been affected (if at all) by the creation of water 
markets in Southern California, focusing on the San Diego County Water Authority-Imperial 
Irrigation District relationship.   
 Hypothesis 
Agriculture 
In the years 2003-2011, there were significant water transfers from the IID to the SDCWA; it is 
at these points where it is plausible that we can expect to see similar decreases in:                        
(a) Total amount of acres harvested 
(b) Heads of livestock 
(c) Acreage of Water Intensive Field Crops  
Assuming the previous, after eight years of the Quantification Settlement Agreement 
implementation, the plausible effect of reduction in overall water available to Imperial Valley 
agriculture would be a parallel decrease in water intensive forms of agriculture, specifically 
variables a,b and c. The same rationale is applied to an increase in yields per acre, and less water 
intensive crops because it would be a plausible statement for farmers to switch crops due to the 
availability of water. Therefore, we would expect to see an increase in: 
(a) Yield Per Acre 
All data collected on agricultural patterns was compiled from the Imperial County Agricultural 
Commissioner’s annual reports published between the years 2001-2011. 
Water Use: If the true effect of the QSA was an effort to curtail water overuse by the IID, then 
we would expect to see a decline in consumptive water use by the IID at a minimum to its 
allotted 3.1 MAF  
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that decrease water loss. 
(b) We would expect to see an increase in on-farm water conservation efforts. 
Data on water usage was collected from the IID’s QSA Reports and the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s reports on water usage published between the years 2001-2011. 
Farmworker: We would expect to see that programs would be put in place to lessen the 
economic effects of the QSA on farmworkers and firms that supply farms with equipment and 
supplies.  Interviews were conducted with farmworker advocacy groups and other personal 
familiar with the subject. Data collected on farm employment was collected from the California 
Development Department for Imperial County during the measured period 
 
(I) Agriculture: What has been the response from Imperial Valley 
farmers in relation to the reallocation of water per the QSA? 
 
The Imperial Valley agricultural region composes of more than 540,000 acres of 
harvested land as of 20118. It is seemingly oxymoronic that in an area that gets less than 3 inches 
of rain per year some of its top exports are water intensive commodities, such as field crops that 
use up to 8 acres of water per acres.  The amount of water used to harvest a single acre of Alfalfa 
throughout the year would surpass a 6-foot tall person by two feet9. Similarly, livestock can use 
anywhere from 25 to 50 gallons of water, per head; in 2011, there were more than 400,000 heads 
of livestock in Imperial County10 . The low cost of water makes it profitable for this sort of water 
intensive type of agriculture and livestock to occur in such a dry region, for instance, the price of 
water in 2011 from the Imperial Irrigation District was $20 per acre-foot (Imperial Irrigation 
District 2012). That equates to $80 per annum to water an acre of Alfalfa that produces over 
$1600 dollars, or water amounts to less than 5% (4.9) of the total revenue.  
 
                                                
8 United States. Imperial County. Agricultural Commissioner. 2011 Agricultural Crop and Livestock Report. By 
Connie Valenzuela. El Centro: County of Imperial, CA. Print. 
9 Hanson, Blaine. Irrigation of California Agriculture. Sacramento: California Air Resources Board, 2 Dec. 2008. 
PDF. 
10 Huston, Susan, Nancy Barber, Joan Kenny, Kristen Linsey, Deborah Lumia, and Molly Maupin. "Livestock 
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Changes to Imperial Valley Agriculture, 2001-2011 
 
The following data was compiled from the Imperial County Agricultural Commissioner’s 
annual Agricultural Crop and Livestock Report: 
http://www.co.imperial.ca.us/ag/Departments_A/agricultural_crop_&_livestock_reports.htm.  
Between the years 2001 and 2011 the total harvested acreage in the Imperial Valley declined by 
3.11% or 17,078 acres. The overall decline throughout the time period was not linear and peaked 
in 2008 at 599,040, falling sharply to 531,547 in 2011. Over the time period, the Valley’s 
acreage has fluxed up 9.18% at its peak, then falling 11.26% by the end of 2011. On the 
contrary, the gross value of Imperial Valley agriculture has increased 94.4% from its valuation in 
2001. An equally important variable in Imperial Valley economy is the livestock industry, which 
consistently is the highest valued subsection of agriculture. The value and headcount (number of 
sheep and/or cattle) over the measured period was measured. The headcount (number of cattle 
and sheep) fell 19.3% or by 105,485 units of livestock. The gross value of livestock had a 
negative relationship, increasing 66% from 2001 to a net worth of 403,880,000. 
In general, the scope and scale of water-intensive patterns of agriculture within the 
Imperial Valley were reduced between the years 2001-2011. The opposite was true in terms of 
their net value, thus, no correlation between market forces and the scale of water-intensive 
patterns of agricultural practices in the Imperial Valley after the implementation of the QSA per 
se. A comprehensive measurement of these subsectors over the study period was done and will 
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SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO AGRICULTURAL PATTERNS 
IN THE IMPEIRAL VALLEY, 2001-2011 
Harvested Crops Total Harvested Acreage Value in 2011 
Change 2001-2001 -17,078 1,953,766,000 
Percentage Change -3.11 +94.4 
Livestock Total Headcount of Sheep/Cattle Value in 2011 
Change 2001-2001 105,485 403,880,000 
Percentage Change -19.5 +66 
Livestock 
If the hypothesis holds true, we would expect to see the total headcount of livestock in 
Imperial County to decline over the 10-year study period due to this subsector’s high per capita 
water usage. Farmers would be dis-incentivized from increasing the size of their herds, as the 
availability of water would affect the ability for them to do this. To gauge the economic impacts 
of the QSA, both the gross value and per unit value (value per livestock animal) were also 
measured during the 10-year period.  Data from Imperial County Livestock was all complied 
between years 2001-2011, variables graphed include:     
 (1) Total Headcount of Livestock        
 (2) Gross Value of Livestock         
 (3) Per Unit Value of Livestock                        
Livestock is by far one of the highest users of water per capita in the Imperial Valley, but it has 
consistently remained the more revenue-producing sector of agriculture. For instance, cattle 
average between 25 and 40 gallons per day depending on the weather, the higher the 
temperature, the higher per day use of water for Livestock (United States Geological Survey 
2004). The amount of 25 gallons per day was selected for daily per capita livestock water usage; 
the actual amount may be higher. The state of California is the U.S.’s second largest user of both 
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total water usage for livestock was 197 million gallons per day, of those 109 million gallons was 
extracted from surface water, including canal (United States Geological Survey 2004).  
 The following data was compiled from the Imperial County Agricultural Commissioner’s 
annual Agricultural Crop and Livestock Report: 
http://www.co.imperial.ca.us/ag/Departments_A/agricultural_crop_&_livestock_reports.htm.   
 The results yielded were somewhat contradictory; there was a decline in total headcount, 
but at the same time a substantial increase in both the gross value and per unit value of Imperial 
County livestock. There was a 19.35% decline in total headcount of livestock, which peaked 3 
years after the implementation of the QSA in 2006 at a gross valuation of over 400 million. This 
amounts to an increase of 66%, from 243,207,000 in 2001 to a net worth of 403,880,000 in 2011. 
The gross valuation of Imperial Valley livestock increased in 2001 until 2006 at 418,436,000 
before declining until 2010, afterwards rising to near peak levels in 2011 at $403,880,000. 
External market forces may account for this increase, however, further research is needed to 
determine the causality of the large increase in prices for agricultural prod    
 The total headcount in 2001 was 545,122; by 2006 it had peaked to 626,830, but fell to 
just above 428,000 in 2010 before posting a slight increase to just over 439,000 in 2011.The 
difference between pre-QSA and post is a decrease in total heads of livestock 19.35% .It seems 
that the 2006 increase of water transfer from the IID to SDCWA did have a correlation to the 
direct total headcount of Livestock within the Imperial Valley. Similarly, the decreases in from 
the years 2009-11 were reflected in a total decrease in the headcount of livestock.         
Per Unit Value 2001-2011         
 Per-unit value of Imperial County Cattle and Sheep was collected for the years 2001-
2011, in 2001 the per-unit value was $76.19; it had increased 17% to 89.72 in 2011. It had 
peaked in 2006 at a gross worth of over 400 million, During this same ten-year period, the value 
of Imperial County’s livestock increased 66%, from 243,207,000 in 2001 to a net worth of 











































     Velasco 
 
Field Crop Patterns, 2001-2011 
 A focus on the largest water users per capita was to measure the effect of the QSA on the 
scope of the farming of water intensive crops because they have low-marginal value for farmers. 
They include: alfalfa, Bermuda grass hay, Cotton (lint and seed), Kliengrass, pasture crops, and 
Sudan grass Hay.  
For methodological purposes the following variables were tracked for the years 2001-2011 
(1) Gross Value of Field Crops 
(2) Percentage of Field Crops as a part of Total Harvested Acres 
(3) Yield Per Acre and Bale 
(4) Total Harvested Acres 
(5) Value of Total Harvested Acres 
(6) Fallowing Program Conservation in Acre-Feet (AF) 
(7) The Gross Value, Harvested Acres and Price Per Unit for Alfalfa 
If the hypothesis were to hold true, we would expect to see variable 2 and 4 with a steady 
decline as the availability of water would affect a farmers ability to increase acreage of water 
intensive field crops and the overarching effect of the QSA would increase the acreage of idle 
farmland resulting from less water and compensation under SDCWA funded fallowing 
programs. Variable 4 would be expected to increase, as the pressure of less water would 
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yields, basically, the farmer would harvest more crops on the same acre or bale after the 
implementation of the QSA in 2003 as he or she did prior. Variable 6 is one that would be 
expected to steadily increase as per water-delivery schedule the IID is obligated to transfer under 
the QSA. The SDCWA funded fallowing program was a part of a broader strategy to lessen the 
impact of the having less water for farmers to work with by having the water transferred to San 
Diego consist of conservation efforts such as the fallowing program, on-farm water saving 
technology and the lining of major canals to reduce leakage. Variables 1 and 5 are subject to 
market forces outside the scope of the QSA, but they were measured in order to see if 
agricultural prices outweigh the conservation mandate of the QSA. Variable 7, alfalfa, was also 
tracked between the years 2001-2012 because of its dominance in Imperial Valley agriculture as 
a staple for dairy farmers in California and nationwide. Alfalfa is the largest-scale field crop in 
the Imperial Valley, which makes it a leading user of irrigation water.  As with field crops in 
general, it would be expected to decrease in acreage harvested; the associated market information 
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    The following data was compiled from the Imperial County Agricultural Commissioner’s 
annual Agricultural Crop and Livestock Report 
http://www.co.imperial.ca.us/ag/Departments_A/agricultural_crop_&_livestock_reports.htm.  
 Alfalfa   
 Alfalfa uses more water than any other crop in California, comprising of 20% annually of 
all agricultural water use within the state. According to University of California Davis professor 
Blane Hanson, it takes approximately 733 AF of water to grow a 160-acre plot of Alfalfa, or 4.58 
AF per acre (California Air Resources Board 2008). It is a key crop that supports the dairy 
industry not only in California, but increasingly supplies dairy operations across the Great 
Plains/Texas. The ensuing late decade drought that wreaked havoc on the ability of crop and 
dairy farmers alike to feed their livestock, across the nation, particularly in the Great Plains with 
the most severe shortages occurring from Missouri southward to Texas.  The result was a 
shortage of Alfalfa to support livestock, leaving the Imperial Valley, with its reliable 3.1 MAF of 
water, one of the only places where this crop could be grown in large numbers.    
 Alfalfa is a highly capital-intensive crop, requiring specialized heavy-duty machinery to 
harvest and is generally farmed on poor soil, as it has the ability to cleanse the soil of salt 
(California Air Resources Board 2008).  Soil salinity is problem for Imperial Valley due to the 
high levels of naturally occurring salt in the sediment-heavy Colorado River compounded by 
high evaporation rates.          
 The severity of the drought increased during late 2010, leading to the nearly doubling of 
the price-per-bale a farmer in Imperial Valley could reap between 2010 and 2011, and the price 
went from $97.00 per bale in 2001 to $220.00 per bale in 2011 (Imperial County Agricultural 
Commissioner). The $123.00 increase began in 2003 when the price per bale was at an all-time 
low of $83.00 and rose steadily until 2008 when the price hit $193.00 before falling to $107.00; 
however, between 2010 and 2011, the price of Alfalfa rose from $118.00 to $220.00 per bale, 
marking the largest increase in price per bale during the measured period. This correlates to the 
worsening drought with intensified in the Great Plains/Texas in the fall of 2010. Overall, the 
price per bale rose 125% between the years 2001-2011 (Imperial County Agricultural 
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 On the contrary, the total harvested acres of Alfalfa has been in decline throughout the 
measured period, for instance, in 2001 there were just over 184,000 acres of Alfalfa that were 
harvested, by 2011, it had fallen to 118,419 (Imperial County Agricultural Commissioner).This 
represents a decline of 35.8% in total harvested acres of Alfalfa. The overall trend was a steady 
decline in acres harvested, with the exception being the years 2009-2010 when 23, 903 (21%) 
more bales were produced in 2010 than in 2009 (Imperial County Agricultural Commissioner). 
This is correlated with the sharpest increase in price during the study period, which occurred 
2010-2011.           
 It is clear that the scope and scale of Alfalfa as a base crop for Imperial County 
agriculture has decreased since the implementation of the QSA in 2003. The steady decline in 
harvested acres of the crop began one-year prior in 2002. Therefore, the overarching trend of 
decreased scale and scope of Alfalfa farming may have originated in prior to the QSA or it may 
have been farmers forecasting the decreased water supplies and reduced acreage on their own. 
With a plethora of factors affecting what a farmer choses to farm further research is needed to 
clearly define causation variable. Clearly, the importance of one of the most water intensive field 
crops has been on the decline in the Imperial Valley, whether the QSA was the variable that   
began this trend is unclear as correlation is not causation.      
 As Fallowing Program was scaled-up, farmers would be dis-incentivized from farming 
low marginal valued water-intensive crops and would opt to participate in the program? If the 
answer is yes, then proportion of Field Crops as a part of the total harvested acres in Imperial 
County would maintain a negative relationship: As the water conserved via the Fallowing 
Program was increased, the percentage of field crops as the total harvested acreage would 
decrease.            
 From the data it is evident that there is a positive relationship between these two sub-
variables with the exception of the years 2007-2008. Generally, the percentage of harvested acres 
that were field crops followed market trends; the higher the value for field crops, the higher the 
proportion these crops represented in Imperial Valley farm acreage. In 2001, water-intensive 
field crops represented 78.8% of all harvested acres in the Imperial Valley; by 2011 it have fallen 
16.7% to represent only 62% of all farmed acres. The 10-year trend saw the percentage of field 
crops as a part of total harvested acres decline from 2001-2003 and then bowing between the 
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crops, but at the end of the study period, field crops had rebounded to levels higher than in the 
beginning year. From 2001-2002, the gross value remained steadily, only slightly falling, in 2003 
the value had dropped significantly to just over one hundred million, or the lowest level during 
the study period. 
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II. Water Use What has the response to the reallocation and commodification of 
water per the QSA on the part of the Imperial Irrigation District’s consumptive 
water use and conservation efforts?  
BACKROUND INFORMATION 
 
Water Usage, Quality, and Availability: Environmental Challenges to Imperial Valley 
Agriculture Water Usage: 
 
The University of California Cooperative Extension in the Imperial Valley noted that 
field crops account for the majority of harvested crop acreage of irrigated land. The Imperial 
Valley is home to the largest Alfalfa growing region in the world; however, it is a water intensive 
crop necessitating 5 acre-feet of water annually. This crop uses approximately 35% of the total 
crop water use in the Imperial Valley every year. Below is a map of the water delivery system 
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Water Transfer Revenues, Expenses 
The Cost of Transferred Water: 
The QSA set water rates  at 2003 $258 per AF,  and scheduled increases in 2004 to $267 
per AF and a subsequent 3.5%  increase annually until it reaches $420 per AF in the year 2017.  
Stipulations exist which could potentially raise water rates in larger increments if the 
Metropolitan Water Authority raises its rates for their customers. The price for the following the 
initial 15 year period is set to increase as per the GDP Implicit Price Deflator published by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (Federal Quantification Settlement Agreement). 
By 2035, a “shortage premium price” will take effect meaning that in drought years the 
SDCWA will be charged an additional fee for IID water (Federal Quantification Settlement 
Agreement). 
The IID gains financially from the QSA, for instance, by 2016, the SDCWA is expected 
to pay 62 million dollars for 100,000AF of water, or roughly 3% of the total water allotted to the 
IID11. In the absence of the QSA, the IID would be able to take in $20 per acre-foot, under the 
QSA; the entity is able to sell that same AF of water for $420. This amounts to a 95% mark-up in 
the wholesale price of water, thus serving as a major revenue generator for the IID. Additionally, 
the SDCWA agreed to pay a total of 56 million dollars to the IID (6 million was a settlement 
payment to price dispute, 50 million for capital projects) for which it could use to upgrade water 
infrastructure and conservation programs (San Diego County Water Authority 2012). 
Water Efficiency and Reallocation under the QSA 
 
The QSA should not be viewed as a mode of conservation; rather it should be viewed as a 
mode of reallocation. Although the QSA does push for more efficient irrigation technologies, 
land fallowing and the lining of significant portions of major canals, the water ‘conserved’ from 
being used in the Imperial Valley is used as reallocated water that is sold to the SDCWA.  
Portions of the All-American and Coachella Canals have been lined with concrete in 
2010 and 2006 respectively. The annual water conserved from these canals resulted in 
                                                
11 United States. San Diego County Water Authority. Imported Water Management. Quantification Settlement 
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approximately 67,700 acre-feet of water annual being conserved along the All-American Canal 
and 26,000 acre-feet for the Coachella Canal, amounting to 93,700 acre-feet of water (San Diego 
County Water Authority 2012). Conservation from canal-lining occurs because of concrete have 
low porosity, thus, less water can seep through the bottom of the canal, where as an un-lined 
canal loses substantial amounts of water due to the porous nature of non-clay soils. 77,700 acre-
feet of water is then transferred to the SDCWA, while the remaining 11,000 acre-feet of water is 
transferred to the San Diego Band of Mission Indians, settling long-held disputes over 
indigenous water rights in San Diego County. By 2020, canal-lining transfer will amount to 9% 
of the total water transferred from the IID to SDCWA (San Diego County Water Authority 
2012). Over the course of the 110-year agreement between SDCWA and the IID a total of 
8.5MAF will flow to the SDCWA (San Diego County Water Authority 2012). 
Additionally, money has been set aside for on-farm conservation projects such as the 
installation of electronically monitored floodgates and drip-irrigation.  
 
Climatic Variation on the Colorado River Basin 1894-2003:        
 
Projected climate change is expected to alter precipitation patterns and warm over 
temperatures, leading to reduced snow pack, which is a key source of water for water delivery 
infrastructure throughout the Western United States. A reduction of water supply to the dozens 
of water agencies in the arid West places a conservation imperative on water management 
practices and the viability of farming water-intensive crops and livestock. The information below 
delineates the nature of the water crisis in the Colorado River Basin which is responsible for 
delivering water to the Imperial Irrigation District. It underscores the imperative for creating a 
framework for controlling the consumptive use of the Colorado River and has in place 
contingencies to operate this region’s vast array of water allocation system.  
Usable freshwater takes form as precipitation, thus it is affected by climatic variation, a 
more recently, the effects of human-induced climate change and therefore its availability can 
vary drastically from year to year posing a problem of reliability of the commodity (Chong and 
Sundig 2006.) The United States Geological Survey published a report on the state of water flow 
in the Colorado River Basin in relation to climatic fluctuations over the last 100 years of reliable 
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last 800 years12. Water in the Colorado River, which ultimately is used as irrigation water in the 
Imperial Valley 
Scientists at the United States Geological Survey (USGS), in researching the effects of sea 
water temperature and atmospheric pressure variations on the flows of the Colorado River and 
published a report in 2004. The report connected the cyclical recurrence of two climatic events in 
the Pacific Ocean, the first known as El Nino and La Nina refer to the warming and cooling 
trends respectively and their effects on the water flow of the Colorado River, the primary source 
of water for the Imperial Valley.  
Data on the estimated annual water flow of the Colorado River from 1895-2003 has been 
collected and compiled into a report the Department of Interior issued in 2004 (United States 
Geological Survey 2004). Lee’s Ferry is an important point of measure in the Colorado River as 
water passing through is assumed by scientist to be the approximate as the sum of flow volumes 
of the principal rivers flowing into Lake Powell, a major source of water for irrigation in the 
west.   
 
 
From 1950 through 1962, comparison of these inflows with the flow measured at Lee’s 
Ferry indicated that inflow was, on average, 290,000-mnmn annual volumes were 12.4 million 
                                                
12 McCabe, Gregory, Richard Hereford, and Christopher Wilkowske. "Climatic Fluctuations, Drought and Flow in 
the Colorado River Basin." Climatic Fluctuations, Drought, and Flow in the Colorado River. Ed. Robert Webb. 
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acre-feet (MAF) from 1895 through 2003. This volume is less than the more commonly quoted 
annual volume of 15.0 MAF because these analyses do not include water that is consumptively 
used in the upper basin States. The trend in annual flow volume, which decreased by about 0.5 
MAF per decade from 1895 through 2003 is due, in part, to upstream water use (United States 
Geological Survey 2004). 
The period from 1905-1922 was used to estimate water production allocated under the 
Colorado River Compact, the QSA’s predecessor, had the highest long-term annual flow volume 
in the 20th century, averaging 16.1 MAF. The spring melt of 1984, an ENSCO year resulted in 
the higher MAF recorded for the Colorado River and was estimated to be 22.2 MAF, and the 
highest 3-year average is 20.3 MAF for the period 1983-1985 (United States Geological Survey 
2004).              
 The 21st Century has brought extreme drought to the region and record low flows for the 
Colorado River, the lowest annual flow volume of 3.8 MAF occurred in 2002, followed by 3.9 
MAF in 1934 and 4.8 MAF in 1977. The Lee’s Ferry data does not account for consumptive use 
upstream flow indicated that the early 21st century was the time period for the lowest recorded 
flow in more than 100 years of observations, averaging only 5.4 MAF during the 3-year period 
2001-2003. Prior to this time period, the lowest recorded 3-year average flows were 7.3 MAF 
from 1954-1956 and 8.0 MAF from 1933-1935 (United States Geological Survey 2004). 
When the data from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, USBR, is adjusted to include for 
upstream consumptive use (Utah, Colorado, Wyoming) for the period 1906-2003, the three  
lowest 3-year average flows occurred in the 21st century during the following periods:   
(1) 2002-2004 with a 9.2 MAF  
(2) 2000-2002 with a 9.4 MAF 
(3) 2001-2003 with a 9.5 MAF 
There seems to be a critical point in the watershed of the Colorado River onto which a 
failure of the regional water supply system collapses. Add natural climatic variation and human-
induced climate change to the equation and it becomes clear that the QSA, in its application as a 
water-market tool for regional is merely a starting point at which to begin to reign in what had 
been nearly a century of unmonitored water use by the IID. Thus, markets allocate resources to 
those who value the commodity the greatest in the pursuit of a socially optimal allocation of 




     Velasco 
because they are more efficient users of this commodity due to a long-standing conservation 
imperative amongst water agencies from Los Angeles to San Diego. In all, the QSA may serve as 
the beginning of an era conservation that may put farming in the extreme desert in line with the 
reality of the Colorado River watershed’s capacity. Ultimately, the conservation mechanisms the 
QSA created could be a launching point for agricultural water use in Imperial Valley to be as 
efficient as their regional counterparts in coastal, urban Southern California. Yet, the need to 
address the Salton Sea requires participation from all stakeholders, both rural and urban because 
of the regional threat to life, environment and economy a dry Sea poses.  
Water Quality in the Imperial Valley 
 
With as much as 3.1 million acre-feet of Colorado River water are used every year to 
irrigate more than 500,000 acres of lands in the Imperial Valley13.    
 Irrigation water suitability depends on the type and concentration of salts in the irrigation 
water. Salinity is a common problem in arid and semi-arid regions where evaporation exceeds 
precipitation. Salts are naturally present in soil, but irrigation water adds significant amounts of 
salt that lead to the accumulation of salts over time; due to evaporation of pure water, results in 
an increase in soil salinity and a reduction in crop yield (Khaled 2010). Most vegetable crops are 
sensitive to salinity, thus this can negatively crop growth through specific-ion toxicities and 
osmotic effects. Specific-ion toxicity occurs when the concentration of one ion is high enough to 
cause toxicity such chemicals include: Boron, chloride, and sodium. Specific-ion toxicity causes 
leaf burn on the tips and margins of crop leaves (Khaled 2010).  Osmotic effects also result in 
decline in yield and quality due to the movement of water from the cells of plant root to the soil-
water system outside the roots (Khaled 2010). If water uptake is significantly reduced, the plant 
slows down the growth rate. In general, salinity problems are more severe during the early stages 
of growth. Decline in crop yield can be predicted from average root zone salinity (Khaled 2010). 
Thus, despite the large water allotment that the Imperial Valley receives, its use is inherently 
inefficient because of the high-saline nature of Colorado River water that is exacerbated by clay 
soils and high-temperatures which leaves the a salt-laden soil that reduces crop per acre yields. 
                                                
13 Bali, Khaled. "Imperial Valley Spatial Data Infrastructure." Water Quality in the Imperial Valley -. University of 
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This requires farmers to use flood and drain irrigation in order to “flush” the salts from the soil 
and/or use crops that uptake salts and need are water-intensive. Alfalfa is a crop that both needs 
large amounts of water for growth and intakes salts in large quantities, which leaves the Imperial 
Valley as one of the largest Alfalfa growing regions in North America. From Chong and Sundig, 
it was noted that “The use of water is dependent on its application; its quality affects the manner 
in which it can be used, potentially affecting the availability for purchasers,” for the Imperial 
Valley, with an average consumptive use.14       
 In general, vegetable crops are more sensitive to salinity than field crops, but drainage 
systems coupled with good irrigation management strategies are the most effective tools to 
control salinity in most soils. Silt and sediments transport from irrigated fields to Imperial Valley 
drains and rivers has been identified as the primary source of pollution in the Salton Sea 
Watershed (Khaled 2010).  The QSA did little to address environmental flows into the Salton 
Sea due to the fact that after the sunset of the farm fallowing program in 2018, it is expected that 
most of the tail water currently coming as inflow to the Sea will cease.  
Measuring the QSA’s Effect on Farming     
 Measuring the effect of the QSA of the farming of Field crops may be effect by three 
variables. There are (1) Recession, the onset of the worst economic contraction in 70 years could 
have affected the market demand for Imperial Valley commodities. (2) The IID Fallowing 
Program could have skewed the total acres harvested data because in 2003, the IID purchased 
some 40,000 acres of land that was formally known as the Western Farms Ranch. Much of the 
Ranch was situated on poor soil that produced low yields per acre. The initial plan was to set 
aside this land for “Fallowing,” or letting the land idle with no irrigation in order to honor the 
water transfer allotments. The purchase of the land was done so with a 20 million dollar bond 
issued by the public agency, a bond for which there was defeasance in 2009. Following an outcry 
from local farmers who protested the IID’s move to fallow land it owned, they sought to end the 
Western Farms-only fallowing program so that they would be able to generate revenue from the 
program. As an elected body, the IID succumbed to the pressure; instead leasing the land. The 
fallowing program offers farmers $125 per AF, with a 6 acre limit.     
                                                
14 Non-consumptive uses such as draining of tail water into the Salton Sea are considered consumptive use for this 
purpose because the Salton Sea does not drain into the ocean, rather, the environmental flow stops at the lake due to 
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 Agriculture works on cycles, to be specific, a crop-rotation system where land is farmed 
for several years and then is allowed to go idle for a growing season. This is done to let the soil 
regain nutrients and allow for higher yields post idle. Imperial Valley farmers sought to generate 
revenue by being paid to letting land fallow as per the crop rotation cycle.     
 If the QSA’s conservation efforts were to prove successful in increasing efficiency than 
we would expect to see that farmers would yield more crops on a same acre of land in 2011 than 
he or she would have in 2001. A focus was put on field crops as they represent the largest per 
capita users of water among crops grown in the Imperial Valley. In 2001, the average farmer 
yielded 6 units of production, whether it ton or bale, per acre, by 2011 this had increased by 1 
unit to 7. Even the smallest of changes in production efficiency has potential to have profound 
effects on overall yields, as there are over 500,000 acres in harvest annually. During the 
measured period, yields remained static for the first four years, in 2004, the yield-per-acre 
dropped to its lowest levels in 2005 before rising by over 1 point the following year. Afterwards 
the yield-per-acre fell for one year before steadily rising to its highest levels by 2011.  When 
correlating the 10-year average with the gross valuation of Imperial County’s harvested acres, 
this may provide an explanation as to the decrease in yield-per-acre in 2004-2005. Those years 
represented the largest spike in the gross value of Imperial Valley agriculture; thus, one 
explanation may be that market forces of high prices could have caused farmers to expand their 
farms.  However, when the total harvested acreage data compiled from the same time period is 
analyzed, 2004-2005 represented the lowest amount of harvested acreage for Imperial Valley, 
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GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE SCOPE AND VALUE OF IMPERIAL 




































Value for Total Harvested Acreage of 




     Velasco 
SUMMARY OF CONSUMPTIVE WATER USE AND 
CONSERVATION EFFORTS OF THE IID, 2001-2011 
Year 
Consumptive 






2003 3,111,102 3,445 0 0 11,102 
2004 2,906,819 79,781 0 30,239 -166,408 
2005 2,915,333 71,277 0 21,476 -159,881 
2006 3,108,957 98,619 0 0 8,957 
2007 3,106,358 111,115 0 23,306 6,358 
2008 3,052,001 88,050 8,232 26,085 -47,999 
2009 2,862,258 90,133 21,797 30,158 -237,767 
2010 2,892,075 103,761 6,809 80,282 -207,925 
2011 3,209,912 63,278 26,528 0 99,384 
TOTALS 
(AVERAGE) (3,018,312) 709,459 63,366 211,546 -694,179 
 
Consumptive water use by the Imperial Irrigation District varies annually due to a 
number of criteria such as environmental conditions like annual rainfall, salinity of Colorado 
River at the point of diversion (Imperial Dam), but also, market forces such as the price of water 
intensive and drought resistant crops. The higher the price for those commodities may prompt 
farmers to plant more acres of those crops (water-intensive) which can increase the consumptive 
use of water. Variations may come in as little as a few thousand acre-feet or a few hundred 
thousand acre-feet (AF.) Water allotments are annual and static (as per the QSA) with the 
exception of drought years. The current water allotment delivery scheme is based on the “Use it 
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of the full annual water right given to them, that amount is lost and the underutilized water-right 
does not roll over into the following year. This type of water-right does not incentivize a political 
framework that is centered in conservation; at this point it is where the QSA alters the status quo 
forth overuse repayment programs.        
 The Consumptive Use of the Imperial Irrigation District was tracked from 2003-2011; 
from the data it is apparent that the water district has consistently under-utilized its water rights 
since the implementation of the QSA15 . All the data was collected from the IID’s QSA Water 
Reports and the Bureau of Reclamations consumptive water reports for the years 2003 through 
2011. During this time period, the IID underused (reported annually as an Underrun) 694,179 AF 
of water since the implantation of the QSA. The IID reported “underruns” in 5 out of the 9 years 
between 2003 and 2009, only overusing its water allotment four times, the largest of which 
occurred in 2011, when the district used nearly 100,000 AF more than it was supposed to, the 
next largest overrun was about a tenth of the 2011 event (Imperial Irrigation District).  
 The QSA mandated that the IID divert water to the Salton Sea as a shrinkage-mitigation 
effort as many in the Imperial Valley feared a worsening of toxic dust storms would be amplified 
by the decrease in agricultural water runoff entering the Sea. Since 2003 a total of 211,546 AF 
has been diverted into the Salton Sea. With an annual evaporation rate far exceeding the total 
amount delivered to the Salton Sea for the entire 9-year period, it is plausible to say that the 
QSA-mandated delivery does little to solve the problem of shrinkage. It would require much 
more water to seriously mitigate the shrinkage of the Salton Sea.      
 Efficiency gains have been made since 2008, such as on-farm conservation efforts have 
yielded 63,366 AF in water conserved (Imperial Irrigation District). If an annual average of 
water conserved during the four years the program has yielded results it would amount to 
approximately 15,841 AF being saved annually (Imperial Irrigation District).   
 The fallowing program has been the largest contributor to conservation efforts and has 
served as the primary source of water being transferred to the San Diego County Water 
Authority (SDCWA.) A total of 709,459 AF have been conserved between 2003 and 2011, if a 
yearly average were tabulated, it would amount to an annual savings of 78,828 AF for the IID 
(Imperial Irrigation District). It is a program that requires the land be fallowed for at least one 
                                                
15 Kelly, Kevin E. "QSA Annual Reports." Annual QSA Implementation Report. Imperial Irrigation District, 1 July 
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growing season and the farmer is compensated a rate that varies from year to year; the program 
is set to sunset in 2017 (Imperial Irrigation District). In the years between 2003 and 2011, either 
fallowing of farmland or on-farm efficiency programs either conserved a total of 772,825AF of 
water (Imperial Irrigation District). This amounts to an average of 85,869AF per year or 
approximately 2.77% of the 3.1MAF allotted to the IID (Imperial Irrigation District).  
 When comparing both the AF Yielded by the Fallowing Program with the IID’s 
consumptive Use, there is a trend. From 2003-2005 as the AF Fallowed substantially increased 
from zero to over 70,000AF the consumptive use of the IID decreased, as the fallowing program 
continued its increase, peaking in 2007 with 111,115AF, the consumptive use increased in 
tandem. In 2008 and 2009 the fallowing program declined and the acre-feet conserved stagnated, 
but the consumptive use of the IID declined substantially (Imperial Irrigation District). The 
fallowing program increased in 2010 before falling to its lowest level since it made gains in 
2004, it may be these two factors (decrease in fallowing and increase in consumptive use) that 
lead to the largest overrun by the IID in 2011 since the QSA was implemented in 2003 (Imperial 
Irrigation District).  It is clear that the overall trend of water use by the IID in the 9-year period 
after the implementation of the QSA saw an average water-use of 3,018,313; that is an average 
yearly underrun of 81,687AF (Imperial Irrigation District).However, in the largest overrun 
during the period occurred in 2011, if that trend continues, it may raise the average consumptive-
use of water by the IID and possibly, over the 3.1MAF threshold. Clearly, the QSA has had the 
effect of keeping the IID’s water use under the limit set forth by the federal government. From 
this data, it is plausible to say that the QSA has improved the situation of the most contentious 
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(III) Farmworker: What has been the response to the water reallocation and 
commodification of water per the QSA on the part of farmworkers and farmworker 
advocacy groups? 
The Valley’s institutions, federal, state and local, political, social and labor maintain 
complex, sometimes combative relationships with one another. Since its inception, 
landownership in the Valley had been restricted to Caucasian community members while the 
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At times, this has erupted in violence, most recently in 1979 with the Farm Workers Union Strike 
and a Supreme Court lawsuit, which would have implemented a redistributive-residency, based 
form of landownership. Overall, the state’s developmental paradigm has been one where the 
territorialization of state agencies with oversight over the Imperial Valley has been regeneration 
of concentrated accumulation of private wealth. Farm owners are tied to strict vertical contracts 
with agribusiness wholesalers located in Salinas, California. Such contracts call for prices of 
crop so low that profit is only possible at scales requiring a level of specialization where capital 
intensive forms of farming by means specialized machinery costing hundreds of thousands of 
dollars and the use of chemically based pesticides. As a result, wages have been kept remarkably 
low given the intensive nature of mechanized farming in an area where temperatures soar into 
the triple-digits before noon for four months of the year. Farm workers no longer come from the 
cities of the Valley, but from migrant workers hailing from the neighboring city of Mexicali, 
Baja California in Mexico. These workers endure long wait times at the Calexico Port-of-Entry 
and fees for bus transportation to and from field sites. In terms of Labor relations, this ultra-
mechanized form of Agriculture exploits the personal conditions of thousands of migrant farm 
workers from the neighboring Mexicali Valley (Lopez 2013).     
 In 2003, the Latino Legislative Caucus of the California State Senate published a 
memorandum on the “Impact on Farmworkers of Proposed Water Transfer from Imperial 
County.” This document sought to quantify the effects of the then proposed Quantification 
Settlement Agreement on Imperial County farmworkers16. It took note of what happened in 
California’s Colusa County in 1992 when a drought forced a 25% reduction in water availability 
(Martin 2003). The memorandum centered around three central questions that laid the foundation 
for which the report based its projects of the impacts of water transfers on farmworkers:                
(1) How do farmers respond to less water (e.g., do they use water more efficiently on current 
crops and idle land or switch crops)?                                                                                                    
(2) How do these changes in cropping patterns affect farmworker employment and income?                
(3) How quickly do displaced farmworkers and other find alternative sources of employment and 
                                                
16 California. California State Senate. Latino Legislative Caucus. Impact on Farmworkers of Proposed Water 
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income, which cannot be done without making economic adjustment assumptions (Martin 
2003)?            
 The Colusa Valley example proved that the water reduction lead to a personal income 
loss of county residents by 5% reduced average county employment by 1.3%, with a 3.9% loss in 
farm employment (Martin 2003). The report devised a water loss-employment ratio of 19 to 1, or 
that a 19% reduction in water reduced total employment by 1% and a 6 to 1 ratio for general 
farm employment, or a 6% reduction in water results in a 1% loss in farm employment (Martin, 
2003.) The memorandum goes further into quantifying the effects of the QSA on Imperial 
County farm employment noting a worst-case scenario of a transfer of 10% of water to the urban 
Southern California would result in a total employment loss for the county at 0.5% or 258 jobs or 
from 51,600 to approximately 51, 350 (Martin 2003). On-farm related employment would 
decrease by 1.6% or 202 jobs, falling from 12,600 to 12,400. The report draws a distinction 
between Colusa County, where farm work comprised of 32% of the total workforce at the time 
of water loss, and Imperial County, where farm work amounts to 24% of total employment in 
2001 (Martin 2003). Thus, the authors of the report predicted that a lesser effect on income and 
employment multipliers would occur as a result of the QSA on Imperial County than the water 
crisis in Colusa County.   
Changes to Farmworker Employment in the Imperial Valley, 2001-2011 
 Data for the following section was taken from the Economic Development Department of 
the State of California’s website that contained county level employment data. From 2001 to 
2011, the number of on-farm jobs (e.g. farmworkers) fell from 11,300 to 9,400 or by 16.8%. In 
2001, farm workers represented 22.6% of the labor force within Imperial County, by 2011, 
farmworkers were 17.4% of the labor force.  However, in 2001 there was 3.1% more harvested 
acreage of farmland for which farm work could be derived, so another measure of the QSA’s 
effect on farmworkers would be to quantify how many farmworkers per acre there were at both 
ends of the study period. This would gauge the labor intensity of the effect of the QSA on the 
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occurred after a 7-year implementation period.  In 2001 there was 48.5 farmworkers per acre and 
in 2011 that number had increased to 56.5 farmworkers per acre. Therefore, it is plausible to say 
that the QSA had the effect of decreasing the total number of on-farm jobs, but parallel to that 
increased the number of farmworkers needed to harvest that same acre in 2011 than it did in 
2001.             
 Between the years 2003 and 2011, the average yearly consumptive use of water by the 
IID stood at 3,018,313MAF or about 2.98% less than what the agency had used in 2003 
(reported consumptive use of 3,111,102.) The decline was relatively parallel to the decrease in 
harvested acres during the measured period, which decline 3.1%. The loss in farmworker 
amounted to a decline of 16%; therefore, report issued by the California State Senate grossly 
underestimated the impact of the QSA on the farmworkers of the Imperial Valley. The reality on 
the ground was a 3:16 ratio as opposed to the 6:1 ratio in the report, basically, for every 3% 
decline in water availability, there is a responding 16% loss in on-farm employment. It cannot be 
conclusive to attribute the percentage decline in the number of on-farm employment to 
agricultural patterns because the data points to the fact that capital-intensive crops that require 
substantially fewer workers, such as the various hays grown in the Valley have actually declined 
in both overall acreage and their proportion of Imperial Valley harvested acreage. The inverse 
relationship of declining on-farm jobs and an increasing farmworker-per-acre ratio may point to 
the increase in labor-intensive crops. Nonetheless, as the QSA progresses any further decline in 
the availability of water will only exacerbate the loss of on-farm jobs and affect the ability of 
farmworkers to find employment.          
 Overall, the Imperial County economy had already suffered from high-unemployment 
rates prior to the QSA when the “Great Recession” began to intensify in 2007. For instance, the 
unemployment rate was at 15% or more prior to the QSA in 2003, by 2011, the rate had nearly 
doubled to 29.7%. These two forces, both existing high-unemployment and the Great Recession 
make it difficult to gauge the effect of the QSA on the entirety of the Imperial Valley economy. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, a considerable focus the number of farmworkers and 
the farmworker-per-acre ratio are crossed-referenced with overall data on water-usage and 
agricultural patters in order to identify any variables that could affect the ability of the 
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Interviews 
An interview was conducted with the Brawley, CA-based farmworker advocacy group 
Campensinos Unidos. Director Jose M. Lopez was asked a series of questions regarding what he 
thought the effect of QSA had been on farmworkers. One of the first points he made was that the 
less harvested acreage, the less crop there is that needs tending, which boils down to less work 
for farmworkers and workers in supporting positions (e.g. pesticide application, machinery 
sale/repair people.) This decline in available work, he said, reduced the purchasing power of the 
Imperial Valley farmworker and associated workers, and in turn has the effect of depressing the 
economy of the Valley as a whole. He was asked which worker, domestic or foreign had the 
QSA affected more adversely. Mr. Lopez responded that the domestic farmworker (U.S. 
National) was affected more adversely because the cost of living in the Imperial Valley is much 
higher than that of the neighboring Mexicali Valley. Whereas the American farmworker had 
fared worse than the migratory worker from the Mexicali Valley, he said, the farmworker has 
been the most affected by the QSA because the economic mitigation program paid for by the San 
Diego County Water Authority and operated by the Imperial Irrigation District as the Local 
Entity Program did poor outreach to farmworkers, made no leaflet in Spanish was available, 
despite the fact that most farmworkers are Spanish speaking migratory workers who travel daily 
from Mexicali. He added, for the little assistance that was made available, it was all applications 
are internet-based. In his view, the Local Entity Program was made to benefit the farmers for lost 
water and thus farmable acreage as well as the vendors of produce rather than the people who 
toiled the soil.           
 Another interview was conducted with Gustavo Reza, co-coordinator of the Local Entity 
Program (LEP), he was asked about the program and how it functions. The San Diego County 
Water Authority funded program is intended to lessen the effects of the QSA’s Fallowing 
Program on the Imperial Valley community. Economic mitigation funds are intended for those 
who are (1) Directly-Impacted and (2) Indirectly-Impacted. The SDCWA set aside 50 million 
dollars for the program, which is structured to parallel the Fallowing Program, which began in 
2003 and is expected to sunset in 2018. Persons or businesses who were directly impacted as a 
result of the QSA-Fallowing Program must prove that they were involved with the operation of 
the farm in some way and prove that they cannot find work as a result of the fallowing of the 
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conservation mandate. This process is non-competitive and submissions have to be made with 
the signature of the farmer stating a historical working connection to the field, this includes 
farmworkers, pesticide providers and all jobs that contribute to active farming. If the farmworker 
cannot get the signature of the farmer, he or she must prove a historical connection to the field 
and may get documentation from the farm service provider. When asked about the language of 
the document, he stated that all LEP documentation is only in English. The application is 
available only on-line from the IID. Community service organizations and businesses that have 
no direct connection to farming may also apply for LEP funds under a competitive process. They 
are required to prove that the funds disbursed will be used for community development within 
the Imperial Valley. To date, Mr. Reza said about 2/3rd of the economic mitigation funds have 
been disbursed under the non-competitive direct impact to persons and businesses and the 
remaining 1/3rd has been given to community service providers and businesses under the indirect 
impact portion of the LEP.           
 In his view, the Imperial Valley’s economy is highly dependent on agriculture and the 
LEP is necessary to help the community during this time of transition. Since the LEP began 
distributing economic mitigation funds a total of 147 jobs were created, 221 were retained and 
many others have received vocational training, in order to become qualified for jobs outside the 
agricultural industry.  Mr. Reza stated that during the first year, the LEP required that the 
distributed funds were tracked, in order to make sure that the funds were spent within the 
Imperial Valley.  To date, he estimates that 70-80% of the funds have stayed within the Valley; 
when he was asked why the LEP did not continue to track the funds after 2008, he stated that the 
process became cumbersome, noting that it is nearly impossible to track where every dollar 
distributed is spent. An important point he made was the difficulty he has had in denying those in 
the apiary industry economic mitigation funds. Mr. Reza said that this industry remains ineligible 
because bee’s grange range is about a 5-mile radius of their respective hives, therefore, the LEP 
cannot make a definitive loss statement due to fallowing because of their long-range travel 
makes it likely that they will find a non-fallowed field. In addition, he stated that the growers, 
hired to contract farm service providers are ineligible because they can find other field for which 
to lease and farm.  Thus, the LEP has been unable to distribute funds to those in the Apiary 
Industry and tenant farmers (growers); this has been one portion of the program that under the 
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 The third and final interview was conducted with Benny Andres, an associate professor at 
the University of North Carolina, Charlotte and former resident/activist/professor in the Imperial 
Valley. Mr. Andres was asked about his thoughts about the QSA and its effect on the Imperial 
Valley. He began by noting that just prior to the QSA in early 2003, the Imperial Irrigation 
District (IID) anticipating the need to fallow some of the Valley’s Agricultural acreage 
purchased the Western Farms Ranch, a 40,000-acre property that was to be set aside for idling 
(what was to be a part of the fallowing program) because most of the land in the ranch was of 
poor quality and used for the then-low value Alfalfa crop. The plan was to lessen the impact of 
the QSA’s conservation mandate by idling poor quality land while farmers could continue to 
farm largely as they had done prior. Farmers complained that they wanted compensation for 
fallowing; the democratically elected board of the IID was privy to the concerns of farmers that 
could easily launch a campaign against the current board. The IID gave into their demands and 
set-up a process for farmers to receive compensation to idle land. However, Mr. Andres stated 
that the crop rotation cycle necessitated that a farmer idle his or her land for approximately 6 or 7 
months. Thus, farmers had effectively generated revenue by getting paid to fallow land that 
would otherwise be left to be idle.         
 He stated that at any time there is about 30,000 acres of farmable land in the Imperial 
Valley that is not being farmed. Mr. Andres was also asked about variable that could affect the 
farmworker. He stated that the Texas drought left the Imperial Valley as one of the few places in 
the United States where Alfalfa, a crop used as feed for livestock, could be farmed. This and 
other hay crops are capital-intensive forms of agriculture while, requiring the use of expensive 
machinery (one operator) and almost no other workers. Vegetables and fruits are labor intensive, 
requiring many field workers to harvest and maintain the crop, however, low capital costs for 
machinery.    
Commentary the Economic Mitigation Efforts and Graphic Representations of 
Farmworker Employment 
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There are three key points gathered from the interviews relating to the social impact of the QSA:   
(1) The application for economic mitigation funds needs to be more responsive to the 
populations affected by the QSA, hence these material need to be bilingual, in both Spanish and 
English, as the majority of farmworkers hail from Mexicali, Mexico where Spanish is their 
primary language. In addition, materials need to be posted in areas where farmworkers 
congregate, specifically, where the buses take workers from the Port-of-Entry in downtown 
Calexico, CA to the various farms where they work. Bilingual public outreach is needed at the 
Port-of-Entry during times when farmworkers enter the United States during the early morning 
hours and afternoon when they return.                
(2) Farmers (not to be confused with tenant farmers who are contracted out to do the actual 
agricultural work) need to be more responsive to workers, past and present who are negatively 
affected by the QSA and seeking economic mitigation funds. Specifically, if they have workers 
and/or firms who are eligible for such funds, they ought to be mandated to confirm their 
eligibility. Because they reap the majority of the benefits from the paid conservation programs 
under the QSA, those payments should come with the requirement that they actively work with 
displaced workers and firms in the application process.                                                          
(3) Tenant farmers contracted out to do the actual agricultural work and those in the Apiary 
industry need to be eligible for economic mitigation funds, although they are able to find work 
elsewhere, in the absence of workforce development program that assists them in finding work, 
those responsible for distributing mitigation funds need to collaborate with the broader economic 
development community in the Imperial Valley.       
 The IID, specifically, the LEP office ought to seek out reforms that are responsive to the 
workers and firms that support Imperial Valley’s multi-billion dollar agricultural industry and 
need not to focus only on the farmer who owns the property, but those who toil in the Valley’s 
sometimes inhospitable climate, because it is these workers and firms that make it possible for 
owners of farms to reap the economic benefits of their work. This may require community 
building at the level of workers and supportive firms in generating the political capital to push 
the IID to a more equitable distribution of economic mitigation funds. Or it may be the case that 
the LEP program needs to be coordinated outside the IID, under an independent body to ensure 
that the SDCWA’s fee paying customers, who ultimately pay for these programs are confident 
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has been little public oversight, besides complicated, web-exclusive based reports published by 
the IID as to who the water agency is doing with the tens of millions of dollars in revenue 
generated by the water transfer.  
The Importance of Crop Production in the Imperial Valley Economy 
 A location quotient or LQ is the result of a commonly utilized economic base analysis 
method. A Location Quotient Technique (LQT) offers a more complex model to the variety of 
analytical tools available to economic base analysts for metropolitan areas17. The LQT compares 
the local economy to a reference economy, in the process attempting to identify specializations 
in the local economy; based upon a calculated ratio between the local economy and the economy 
of some reference unit (Florida State University). Any LQ above 1.25 equates to the sector of the 
economy with a major impact on the economy (Florida State University). The location quotient 
for the years 2007 and 2010 was done on the agricultural sub sector called “crop production,” for 
both the El Centro metropolitan statistical area and the state of California. By choosing both the 
state and local crop production subsector, it would be clear to separate local trends from those 
statewide. These years were selected to gauge the effect of the QSA on crop production within 
the Imperial Valley as the QSA’s water conservation efforts were intensified in 2008. In 2010 the 
LQ of crop production stood at 17.84, on the other hand, the state of California’s LQ was at 2.84; 
it is evident that crop production plays a much larger role in the local economy.  However, this 
sector has declined .69 from a LQ of 18.53. Statewide, Crop Production declined by a lesser 
amount, going from 2.86 in 2007 to 2.84, a decline of .02. Therefore, it is plausible to say that 
the role of crop production in the Imperial Valley declined at a much larger rate than it did at the 
state-level. This suggests that there was some external factor, apart from the economic 
contraction that exacerbated losses in the importance of the sub sector within the Imperial 
Valley. 
 
                                                
17 Department of City and Regional Planning. "Location Quotient Technique Page. “Location Quotient Technique 
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Conclusion 
Returning to the central and subsidiary question(s):         
What has been the response to water reallocation and commodification as per 
the QSA in the Imperial Valley?  
 
Water conservation is seen as good public policy; however, it may not be the best route 
for regulatory agencies’ to pursue in the case of the Imperial Valley. As previously mentioned, 
the Salton Sea is shrinking at a rate of 7 inches per year and heavily relies on tail water from the 
Valley’s farms, this along with the administrative costs of the QSA have been ignored by the 
state. Thus, the true transactional costs of the water transfer remain unaccounted for; however, 
the LEP program and other mitigating programs such as the lining of portions of the All-
American canal are the only to be quantified. The decline of water-intensive field crops certifies 
their classification as having low marginal value for local farmers. The rise of farmworkers per 
acre ratio could point to the increasing prevalence labor-intensive vegetables that use less water. 
However, further research is needed and it is important to note that correlation is not causation.  
 The QSA has clearly had an effect on the Imperial Valley’s agriculture, water-use and 
farmworkers. They are all linked, each having an effect on the other, for instance, the reduction 
in consumptive water-use affects patterns of agriculture, as water-intensive crops are lessened 
and livestock head counts are reduced. In turn, the pattern of agriculture is altered, leading to a 
restructuring of the local economy as the number of farmworkers falls in tandem with harvested 
acreage, as the purchasing power of both farmworkers and firms that support the operation of 
farms is reduced makes its way through the entirety of the Imperial Valley’s agriculture. Crop 
production, which has a rather large role in the Imperial Valley economy, was noted as declining 
at a rate much larger than the statewide level. Therefore, it is apparent that the QSA had the 
effect of negatively impacting an already weak Imperial Valley economy. In terms of 
environmental management, the QSA did positively affect the amount of water siphoned off the 
Colorado River with a reduction in overall use by 2.98%. However, the Salton Sea continues to 
be a sore spot of environmental management as various stakeholders have failed to execute a 
mitigation plan other than the water dedicated and mitigation funds provided by the IID. Here, it 
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supplies on the Salton Sea. Rather, it is the failure of the state and federal government for having 
an unfunded mitigation mandate that IID cannot manage on its own.    
 From the data it is apparent that between the years 2001-2011 a 3:3:16 ratio developed, a 
3% reduction in water lead to a 3% decline in harvested acreage and a parallel 16% decline in 
on-farm employment.  While a notoriously wasteful water user, the IID, is reigning water-usage 
in the management of the social impacts of the QSA have been mismanaged, at best. 
Farmworkers ability to receive economic mitigation funds or training has again come under the 
realm of farm owners. Given the Imperial Valley’s contentious, sometimes violent oppression of 
the rights of farmworkers, the IID, through the Local Entity Program has allowed farmworkers 
autonomy to be fully realized, by lessening their ability to economic self-determination about his 
or her own economic future by requiring the farm owner to sign off on lengthy application that is 
web-based and only in English to receive training or funds if their jobs are lost due to the QSA. 
The IID has given preference to the farmer (owner) by offering them funds for laying idle their 
land through a fallowing program. From the interviews we have learned that the farmer-owner is 
getting paid to idle his or her land that would otherwise be idle due to the crop rotation cycle.  
 The QSA was implemented in a place where there was pre-existing tension between the 
wealthy, mostly, Caucasian landowners and the predominantly Mexican laborers who worked 
the farms of the Imperial Valley. This social structure was well engrained prior to the QSA, and 
it is not plausible to put the agreement under scrutiny, but rather the institutions that have and 
continue to keep in place a stratified social structure. It may be that the QSA’s economic 
mitigation and water conservation programs serve as a platform to launch the Imperial Valley 
towards a future where there is a more equitable distribution of the responsibilities of massive-
scale agriculture and the associated economic benefits. So that one day, an industry (agriculture) 
that sees a 94% increase in its gross valuation is not tied to a place where, during the same time 
period, there is a near doubling of unemployment.       
 If a severe drought were to hit the Colorado River Watershed, water shortage provisions 
under the QSA would first apply to water authorities with junior water rights, they would see a 
reduction in diversions from the river, however, under a scenario where there is a prolonged 
period of severe or extreme drought, senior water rights holders, such as the IID would see their 
diversions of water be reduced. Steadily rising temperatures may have the effect of shorter 
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River and a fully allocated water supply poses the risk that the IID may at some time face water 
shortages.            
 The idea of growing water intensive crops in an extreme desert like the one that is 
situated in Imperial County, California buckles the notion of rationality. Without irrigation, 
nearly all the crops grown in this place would surely die from drought as this part of the 
Colorado Desert lies in the rain shadow of the coastal mountain range and receives between 1-3 
inches of precipitation annually. The reality of this place lends itself agricultural practices not in 
line with the natural climate. It is unclear whether the QSA has led to a socially optimum 
allocation of water for Southern California. The data points to a mixed-result: consumptive water 
use for the IID has declined over the 10-year period. There is little conservation within the QSA 
because the water saved through efficiency programs is being sent and sold to the SDCWA, and 
at the same time, the Salton Sea is teetering on the edge of collapse. Farmworkers are finding it 
increasingly difficult to find employment, a group already marred by poverty and poor working 
conditions. While economic mitigation programs fail to reach the most vulnerable population 
and seemingly replicate the class-stratified gap between rich and poor, between the minority 
Caucasian farm owner and the majority Mexican farmworker. Water-intensive field crops are 
declining as a total share of the Valley’s harvested acreage, and the corresponding increase in the 
farmworker-to-acre ratio is on the rise, pointing to a shift towards labor intensive crops that 
require less water.  It is important to note that correlation does not mean causation, rather, this 
thesis is a starting point for researchers and policymakers alike to begin to study what has 
worked and what has not under the QSA. With further research, the QSA and proposed 
agreements that parallel it can be crafted to create a true, socially-optimal allocation of water and 
not the replication of a stratified social structure and farming practices that are not in-line with 
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Terms 
• QSA: Federal Quantification Settlement Agreement 
• AF: Acre-Foot, equivalent to 1 foot of water across one acre 
• MAF: Million-Acre-Feet, equivalent to 1 foot of water across one million acres 
• IID: Imperial Irrigation District (transferor) 
• SDCWA: San Diego County Water Authority (transferee)  
• LEP: Local Entity Program, Economic Mitigation Program 
• For all intents and purposes of this paper, the terms “Imperial Valley,” “Valley” is 
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